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STANFORD v. KENTUCKY: DID THE COURT BITE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BULLET?
INTRODUCTION
When seventeen year old Kevin Stanford stormed a gas station and then raped,
sodomized, and killed the station attendant, he resurrected a constitutional contro-
versy.' His death sentence for the heinous offenses forced the United States Supreme
Court to consider the eighth amendment's 2 limitations on juvenile executions.'
Two nagging concerns were inherent in this Constitutional controversy. First,
society has a general uncertainty about the appropriateness of capital punishment.
Since Furman v. Georgia4 and Gregg v. Georgia,5 the death penalty's necessity has
been widely questioned. Second, society has a special regard for minors. Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once stated, "Children have a very special place in
life which law should reflect." 6 Supreme Court precedent suggests that children
deserve special treatment in the courts.7
Pondering these concerns in the context of Kevin Stanford's ruthlessness, a
Supreme Court plurality upheld the eighth amendment constitutionality of the death
penalty for sixteen and seventeen year old capital offenders.8
The Court's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky9 and the companion case, Wilkins
v. Missouri,0 reflects a fragile consensus among the five justices who affirmed Stan-
ford's and Wilkins' death sentences."' This note explores the Court's holding and
its internal conflict over the proper scope of eighth amendment analysis.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974 (1989).
2 See infra note 17.
See Brief for Respondent at 3, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (No. 87-5765).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court struck down several state capital punishment statutes.
Id. at 256-57. The Court's primary criticism was that the statutes gave sentencing juries untrammeled
discretion. This decision led to a several year hiatus on executions. It also compelled society to re-examine
the necessity and humanity of the death penalty. See Note, Gregg v. Georgia: The Search for the Civilized
Standard, 1976 DE. C.L. REV. 645.
5 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of several state capital
punishment statutes. Id. at 207. The court believed that the statutes adequately limited the sentencing jury's
discretion by, inter alia, requiring bifurcated guilt-punishment proceedings.
6 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
I See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
1 Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. at 2980. The plurality consisted of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, White, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
9 Id. at 2969.
10 Id.
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JUVENILE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A HISTORICAL REVIEW
Juvenile executions are not new. The first documented juvenile execution
occurred in 1642 in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts.' 2 The Massachusetts courts
sentenced sixteen year old Thomas Graunger to death for bestiality. 3 Since 1642,
another 281 juveniles have been executed. 4 The most recent juvenile execution was
that of a seventeen year old Texan, James Kelly Pinkerton, who had been convicted
of raping and murdering two persons. I
Prior to the Stanford and Wilkins cases, the Supreme Court had several
opportunities to decide the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. 16 In these
cases, the appellants argued that the juvenile death penalty violated the constitution's
eighth amendment proscription of' 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" ' In asking the
Supreme Court to stay their executions, the appellants asserted that such punishment
was disproportionate to their culpability, that their executions would further no le-
gitimate penal purpose, and that society had "set its face against the execution of
youngsters. "18
In each of these pre-Stanford cases, the Supreme Court refused to reverse the
appellants' death sentences under the eighth amendment. 9 This intentional issue
avoidance compelled former Chief Justice Warren Burger to criticize the Court for
failing to "bite the bullet.' 20
In 1982, the Supreme Court reviewed the death sentence of sixteen year old
Oklahoman, Monty Lee Eddings.2 In Eddings v. Oklahoma,22 the Court reversed
Eddings' death sentence because the trial judge did not give proper consideration to
Eddings' troubled childhood.23 By reversing on these grounds, the Court intention-
12 N. TEETERS & J. HEDBLOM, HANG By THE NECK at 111 (1967).
13 Id.
14 Streib, The Eighth Amendment and CapitalPunishment ofJuveniles, 34CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363,376(1986).
,5 Reidinger, The Death Row Kids, A.B.A. J., April, 1989, at 78, 80. Other juvenile capital offenders who
have been executed in the 1980s include James Terry Roach, age seventeen (South Carolina, January 10,
1986) and Charles Rumbaugh, age seventeen (Texas, September 11, 1985).
11 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (fifteen year-old capital offender's death sentence was
reversed); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sixteen year-old capital offender's death sentence was
reversed).
"7 The eighth amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This casenote focuses upon the "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause of the eighth amendment.
IS Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691.
19 Id. at 2710 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110, n.5.
20 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 127 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
2I Id. at 106. Eddings was convicted of the first degree murder of Oklahoma State Highway Patrol Officer
Crabtree. Eddings killed the officer after the officer "pulled him over" for a traffic violation.
22 Id. at 104.
23 Id. at 112. The Supreme Court reversed Eddings' death sentence on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978). In Lockett, the Court held that the sentencing jury must consider any relevant aspect of the
defendant's character or record when deciding upon a sentence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608. The Court in
Eddings held that the trial court violated the Lockett rule by disregarding Eddings' evidence of a troubled
[Vol. 23:3
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ally side-stepped the eighth amendment issue which Eddings posed in his petition for
certiorari .24
Six years later, the Supreme Court reviewed the death sentence of another
Oklahoma juvenile, William Wayne Thompson.25 Fifteen year old Thompson was
convicted of the gruesome first degree murder of his former brother-in-law. 26 An
Oklahoma adult jury sentenced Thompson to death.2 7 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Thompson challenged the eighth amendment constitutionality of his sen-
tence. 28 A hesitant plurality spared Thompson's life. 29 Four of the justices who
reversed the sentence squarely addressed the eighth amendment issue.3 ° Justice
O'Connor provided the fifth vote for reversal. 31 In her controversial concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor demonstrated her well-documented tendency of defer-
ring to the legislature. 32 Reserving the eighth amendment issue for a later date,
Justice O'Connor overturned Thompson's death sentence because of a flaw in the
Oklahoma statute under which Thompson was sentenced. 33 The Oklahoma capital
punishment statute did not mention a minimum age at which the commission of a
capital crime could lead to the offender's execution. 34 Justice O'Connor viewed this
omission as a signal that the Oklahoma legislature did not carefully consider the
juvenile death penalty issue.35 Justice O'Connor concluded her opinion by inviting
the peoples' elected representatives to decide the ultimate moral issue at stake in the
controversy.
36
In March, 1989, Stanford v. Kentucky37 and Wilkins v. Missouri38 presented the
overly-ripe juvenile death penalty issue. On June 26, 1989, the Supreme Court ended
years of issue evasion by upholding the eighth amendment constitutionality of sev-
enteen year old Kevin Stanford's and sixteen year old Heath Wilkins' death
sentences.39
childhood. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113.
24 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113 n.9.
1 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
26 Id. William Wayne Thompson murdered his ex-brother-in-law, Charles Keene. Thompson v. State, 724
P.2d 780,782 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). The murder was especially heinous. Thompson, in concert with three
older persons, twice shot the victim and cut his throat, chest, and abdomen. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.
Ct. at 2690. He then chained the victim's body to a concrete block and threw him into a river where he
remained for four weeks. Id.
27 Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780.
2 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2691.
29 Id. at 2700; id. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 2700. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun reversed Thompson's death sentence on
eighth amendment grounds.
3' Id. at 2706.





31 109 S. Ct. 2969.
38 Id.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty
upon gruesome facts.4 0
On January 7, 1981, Kentucky juvenile, Kevin N. Stanford, brutally raped,
sodomized, and killed a gasoline station attendant, Baerbel Poore. n" He and his ac-
complice committed the sexual offenses at the gas station. 42 They then drove Poore
to a desolate country road.43 Stanford then shot Poore point-blank in the face and then
lodged a bullet in the back of her head." Stanford and his accomplice claimed
Poore's life, 300 cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a small amount of cash
from the robbery.4 5 Stanford was seventeen years and four months old at the time
of the killing.46
Likewise, Missouri juvenile, Heath Wilkins, also terrorized his victim. 7 On
July 27, 1885, Wilkins entered an Avondale, Missouri convenience store with the
intent to "rob the store and murder whoever was behind the counter."" While his
accomplice raided the cash register, Wilkins attacked Nancy Allen, the 26 year old
clerk and mother of two.4 9 In spite of Allen's cooperation and cries for mercy,
Wilkins repeatedly stabbed her in the chest, heart, and carotid artery.50 After
collecting liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers, and $450 in cash, Wilkins and his
accomplice abandoned the dying Nancy Allen.51 Wilkins was sixteen years and six
months old at the time of the killing.5
2
In Stanford v. Kentucky,53 Kevin Stanford was charged with first degree mur-
der, first degree sodomy, first degree robbery, and receiving stolen property.54 A
Kentucky juvenile court conducted a transfer hearing. 5  The juvenile court deter-
mined that Stanford could not be rehabilitated within the juvenile justice system 6
Pursuant to a Kentucky transfer statute, 57 the juvenile court waived jurisdiction over
40 Id. at 2972-73.
4 Id. at 2972. For a more graphic description of Stanford's brutality, see Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Stanford
v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969.
42 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2972.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2972-73.
41 Id. at 2973.
4 Id. at 2972.
41 Id. at 2973.





53 Id. at 2969.
4 Id. at 2973.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
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Stanford's case and transferred the matter to an adult trial court. 8 An adult trial court
jury convicted Stanford of the charged crimes and sentenced him to death and 45
years imprisonment.5 9 On automatic review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction and sentence. 60 Kevin Stanford appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.61
In Wilkins v. Missouri,62 Heath Wilkins was charged with first degree murder,
armed criminal action, and carrying a concealed weapon.63 Pursuant to a transfer
statute,' a Missouri juvenile court waived jurisdiction and transferred the case to an
adult trial court.65 The juvenile court believed that Wilkins was beyond rehabilita-
tion. Wilkins entered a guilty plea and urged the imposition of his own death
sentence.67 The trial court convicted Wilkins of the charged offenses and sentenced
him to death.68 Upon mandatory review, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction and death sentence. 69 With the help of appointed counsel, Wilkins then
appealed his death sentence to the United States Supreme Court.70
ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment: Framework for Analysis
Before considering the Court's opinion, it is helpful to establish the Court's
traditional approach to eighth amendment controversies. Supreme Court precedent
suggests that eighth amendment questions are subject to three areas of analysis.
1. Ford v. Wainwright Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright71 sets forth the first
"cruel and unusual punishment" test. Under Ford, a punishment is cruel and
unusual if it" constitutes one of those modes or acts of punishment considered cruel
11 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
59 Id.
60 Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 793 (Ky. 1987).
61 Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
62 Id. at 2969.
63 Id. at 2973.
6 Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (Vernon 1983).
65 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2973-74.
68 Id. at 2974.
69 State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987).
70 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
7' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court concluded that the eighth
amendment prohibited the execution of insane convicts. Id. at 410. Ford was convicted of first degree murder
in 1974 and was subsequently sentenced to death. Id. at 401. While awaiting his execution, Ford developed
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and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted" (1791).72
Under the Ford test, juvenile executions are not cruel and unusual punish-
ment.73 In 1791, the common law set the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to
commit any felony at age 14; theoretically, anyone over age 7 could have been
executed.
7 4
2. Trop v. Dulles Analysis
Albert Trop, a private in the U.S. Army, served in French Morocco in 1944.
71
While in service, he was confined in a stockade for his breach of discipline.76 He later
escaped from the stockade. 77 One day after his escape, he willingly surrendered to
an Army officer.78 He was subsequently sentenced to three years of hard labor, for-
feiture of pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. 79 Eight years later, Trop
applied for a passport.80 He was denied the requested passport because his desertion
of the Army rendered him a "non-citizen" under the Nationality Act of 1940. 81 In
an opinion penned by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court agreed that
Trop's loss of citizenship was cruel and unusual punishment.82
In Trop, the Court noted that the words of the eighth amendment are not precise
and their scope is not static. 83 In sparing Trop from losing his citizenship, the Court
articulated a new standard for eighth amendment analysis.84 The Court declared that
the amendment must "draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' 85
Since the 1958 Trop decision, the Court has traditionally considered state
legislation and jury/prosecutor behavior as the "measuring sticks" of society's
evolving standards of decency.86 Some jurists and academicians have called for a
broader scope of Trop v. Dulles analysis. 87 They maintain that opinion polls, world
72 Id. at 405.
71 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
74 Id.








83 Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
85 Id.
'6 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,300 (1987) (race discrepancy); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 789-796 (1982) (felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-597 (1977) (rape); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-182 (1976) (murder). Many state courts have also limited their analysis to state
legislative and jury statistics. See, e.g., Trimble v. Maryland, 300 Md. 387,478 A.2d 1143 (1984); Prejean
v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091, 1098 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Louisiana law).
87 See Streib, supra note 14.
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views, and the opinions of professional and special interest groups are essential to
the determination of society's evolving standards of decency.
88
Under the Trop test, courts have considered capital punishment legislation and
jury/prosecutor statistics regarding the execution of juvenile capital offenders. 89
Some courts have also considered opinion polls, world views, the opinions of pro-
fessional and special interest groups, and analogous statutory age-based classifica-
tions.90
3. "Excessiveness" Analysis
This final area of eighth amendment analysis requires two inquiries. 91 First,
is the punishment proportional to the defendant's blameworthiness?92 Secondly,
does the punishment materially advance any legitimate penological purpose?
93 If
both of these questions are answered affirmatively, the punishment is not excessive.
Conversely, if either of these questions is answered negatively, the punishmeat is ex-
cessive and, therefore, violative of the eighth amendment.
The requirement of proportionality analysis is well established in eighth
amendment jurisprudence. 94 Opponents of the juvenile death penalty assert that
juveniles lack the blameworthiness possessed by their adult counterparts. 95 Because
of this reduced culpability, the opponents argue that the death penalty is dispropor-
tionate to the youth's blameworthiness. 96 This disproportionality, therefore, renders
the juvenile death penalty "excessive."97
Punishment goals, like proportionality analysis, are also deeply rooted in
Eighth Amendment analysis. 98 If no legitimate penal goal is materially advanced by
a certain punishment, that punishment is "excessive." 99 Deterrence and retribution
8 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2975, 2977; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2693-97.
90 Among the age-based statutory classifications considered by some courts are the voting age (eighteen),
the driving age (sixteen in most states), and the drinking age (eighteen - twenty-one in most states). Those
who use these classifications argue that they reflect the minimum age at which juveniles are responsible and
mature. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
9' See, e.g., Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980; Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2698-2700.
92 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (death penalty for mentally retarded convicts);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (race discrepancy); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (felony
murder with recklessly indifferent defendants); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life imprisonment for
drafting a bad check); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (death penalty for rape).
91 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2988.
% Id.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2699,
2700.
99 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7
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are commonly cited as the penal goals behind capital punishment.'00 Opponents of
the juvenile death penalty insist that neither goal is operative for juvenile capital of-
fenders.101 They argue that a juvenile's limited blameworthiness reduces the
retributive value of their execution. 10 2 They also argue that a juvenile's limited
ability to conduct cost-benefit analysis for their conduct reduces the deterrent effect
of juvenile executions.0 3
B. Stanford v. Kentucky: The Scope and Effect of the Decision
1. The Plurality
In an opinion joined by Justices White, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Antonin Scalia upheld the constitutionality of Stanford's and Wilkins' death
sentences. '04 After concluding that the appellants' death sentences would not have
been "cruel and unusual punishment" in 1791,105 the plurality advanced beyond
Ford v. Wainwright'0 6 analysis and began their Trop v. Dulles analysis.
10 7
Under Trop, the plurality considered whether society's evolving standards of
decency forbade juvenile executions. 18 The plurality examined state legislative sta-
tistics and jury/prosecutor behavior. 1°9 Of the 37 states which allow the death
penalty, the plurality found that fifteen of them outlaw the execution of offenders
under age seventeen. 110 Twelve of the 37 jurisdictions which allow the death penalty
forbid the execution of offenders under age eighteen.' The plurality examined
these statistics in light of the Tison v. Arizona decision. 11 In Tison, the Court upheld
the eighth amendment constitutionality of the death penalty for recklessly indiffer-
ent defendants who participate in a felony that results in death.1 3 The Tison court
found that only eleven of the 37 death penalty jurisdictions rejected the death penalty
of such defendants. 114  The Tison Court concluded that the rejection of this
punishment by eleven jurisdictions did not render it contrary to society's evolving
"o Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699.
... See, e.g., Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699, 2700.
102 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103 Id.
114 Id. at 2980.
101 Id. at 2974.
106 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (set forth the first strand of eighth amendment analysis: Would
the punishment have been "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted (1791)?)
107 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
108 Id.
109 id. at 2975-77.
110 Id. at 2975.
"I Id.
112 401 U.S. 137 (1987).
13 Id. at 158. In Tison v. Arizona, Ricky and Raymond Tison helped their father to escape from prison. During
the getaway, the defendants commandeered a passing car which carried the murder victims. Ricky and
Raymond Tison stood by and watched as their father and another prison escapee riddled the victims' bodies
with bullets. Id. at 141.
114 Id. at 154.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss3/10
standards of decency.115 Finding the Tison legislative statistics to be similar to those
for the juvenile death penalty, the plurality in Stanford concluded that the execution
of eighteen and seventeen year old capital offenders does not violate society's
evolving standards of decency.' 16 The plurality also concluded that prosecutors are
not unduly reluctant to seek nor are juries reluctant to impose the death sentence for
juvenile offenders.' The plurality insisted that the infrequency of juvenile
executions is more readily explained by the smaller percentage of juvenile capital
crimes than by any prosecutor or jury reluctance. 118
Conspicuously absent from the plurality's Trop analysis were opinion polls,
age-based statutory classifications, world opinion and practice, and the opinions of
professional and special interest groups. The plurality rejected this evidence as an
"uncertain foundation" for constitutional law."19
Proceeding to the "excessiveness" inquiry, the plurality minimized the
importance of proportionality analysis. 20 Justice Scalia insisted that objective leg-
islative and prosecutor/jury statistics were far more important.' 21 Justice Scalia also
concluded that Stanford's and Wilkins' executions would further the legitimate
penal goals of retribution and deterrence.
122
The plurality's opinion is well-reasoned. Because juvenile executions would
not have been "cruel and unusual punishment" in 1791, Ford v. Wainwright123 does
not necessitate the reversal of Stanford's and Wilkins' death sentences.
The plurality's Trop v. Dulles analysis is proper. Few courts have ventured
beyond objective legislative and jury/prosecutor statistics in their Trop analysis.124
Opinion polls and the opinions of professional and special interest groups are
uncertain and reflect the values and beliefs of only limited sectors of society.
Likewise, age-based statutory classifications of the voting, driving, and drinking age
are unhelpful in determining society's evolving standards of decency. As Justice
Scalia argued, "It is... absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive
carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough
115 Id.
116 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2976. For reference, the Supreme Court held that society's evolving standards of
decency were violated in the following cases: Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (only 2 states mandated
life imprisonment for drafting a bad check when convicted under a recidivist statute); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (only 8 states allowed execution in similar felony murder circumstances).
117 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
118 Id.
19 Id. at 2979.
120 id. at 2980.
121 Id.
122 id. at 2979. "We reject petitioners' argument that we should invalidate capital punishment... on the
ground that it fails to serve the legitimate goals of penology." Id.
123 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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to understand that murdering another human being is profoundly wrong." 125 Fur-
thermore, the voting, driving, and drinking age-based classifications are established
by considering the maturity of juveniles, as a class.126 However, death penalty ju-
risprudence demands the individualized consideration of juveniles. 27 The plurality
insisted that Stanford and Wilkins received sufficient "individualized considera-
tion" through the juvenile court's transfer hearing and the adult court's sentencing
hearing. 121
The plurality omitted one factor from their Trop v. Dulles analysis. In Trop,
the Court considered the number of nations that would impose a similar punish-
ment. 1 29 Finding that only two other nations would strip an Army deserter of his
citizenship, the Trop court concluded that the punishment was "cruel and un-
usual." 3 0 The Stanford plurality refused to consider world opinion on the juvenile
death penalty.' Although world opinion is relevant, it is not as convincing as the
American peoples' opinion, as reflected in objective legislative and jury/prosecutor
statistics. 32 Therefore, this omission does not appreciably weaken the plurality's
opinion.
However, the plurality's opinion is flawed by their omission of proportional-
ity analysis in their "excessiveness" inquiry. The idea that punishment must be
proportional to the defendant's blameworthiness predates the discovery of Amer-
ica. 133 Proportionality has long been required by American courts. 134 In its leading
proportionality case, the United States Supreme Court held, "It is a basic precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the of-
fense."' 35 Although the plurality did not formally conduct proportionality analysis,
few could disagree that the egregious nature of Stanford's and Wilkins' crimes
justify their death sentences. Furthermore, both Stanford and Wilkins were just
months away from the age of majority when they claimed their victims' lives. 136 For
Stanford and Wilkins, proportionality analysis was simply a formality, albeit a
constitutionally necessary one.
-z Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2978.
129 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
130 Id.
'3 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975, n.1.
132 See id.
33 Proportionality analysis can be traced back to the Magna Carta, the First Statute of Westminster, and the
English Bill of Rights. English Courts conducted proportionality analysis in Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State
Tr. 1353, 1356 (1687). In that case, a fine of 30,000 pounds upon Earl of Devon was deemed "excessive
and exorbitant."
11 List of cases employing proportionality analysis, supra note 94.
'31 Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349,367 (1910). In Weems, the defendant was convicted of falsifying a public
document. Id. at 358. For this crime, he was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor in chains. Id. The
Supreme Court found the punishment disproportionate. Id. at 382.
36 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2972-73.
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Therefore, the plurality's opinion is substantially consistent with the Ford v.
Wainwright,'37 Trop v. Dulles,38 and "excessiveness' framework of eighth amend-
ment analysis.' 39 The plurality's omission of world opinion and proportionality
analysis does not appreciably compromise the forcefulness of their opinion.
2. The Concurrence
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote for affirmance of Stanford's and
Wilkins' death sentences. 40 Her concurring opinion renews her commitment to her
Thompson v. Oklahoma analysis.'' Concluding that no national consensus forbids
the execution of sixteen or seventeen year old capital offenders, Justice O'Connor
seemingly established age sixteen as the youngest age at which a capital offender
may be executed.142 However, under O'Connor's Thompson and Stanford opinions,
a capital offender under age sixteen can be executed if the statute under which he was
sentenced specifically established a minimum age of death-eligibility.
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's omission of proportionality
analysis. 143  Citing considerable precedent, O'Connor properly recognized the
firmly ingrained nature of proportionality analysis.' 4 O'Connor also refused to
disregard age-based statutory classifications of juveniles; she believed that they
were relevant in both Thompson and Stanford. 45
The primary criticism of Justice O'Connor's Stanford opinion is her reaf-
firmation of her Thompson analysis. Justice O'Connor's requirement that state
legislatures include a minimum age in their capital punishment statute has been
described as a "loose cannon of a brand new principle" on "the deck of... Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. "146 By dictating the precise wording of state legislation,
Justice O'Connor "interfere[s with] ... the States' legislative processes: the heart
of their sovereignty." 14
3. The Dissent
Justice Brennan vigorously advocated the reversal of Stanford's and Wilkins'
117 477 U.S. 399.
M 356 U.S. 86.
139 The "excessiveness" analysis involves proportionality analysis and the assessment of the punishment's
purpose(s).
140 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14 Id. Justice O'Connor's Thompson analysis requires state legislatures to establish a minimum age of death-
eligibility in their capital punishment statutes. This requirement is operative when the existence of a national
consensus is uncertain.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2981-82.
14 Id.
141 Id. at 2982.





Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
death sentences.148 In an opinion joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and
Stevens, Justice Brennan asserted that the juvenile death penalty violated society's
"evolving standards of decency." 4
9
Recognizing that Ford v. Wainwright 50 permits juvenile executions, the
dissent opened their opinion with Trop v. Dulles' analysis. 52 The dissent asserted
that 27 states reject the juvenile death penalty.5 3 To arrive at this figure, Justice
Brennan included the states which entirely reject capital punishment.'5 4 Justice
Scalia chided the dissent for "work[ing] its statistical magic." 5 Scalia believed
that the juvenile death penalty inquiry should be limited to the thirty-seven states
which allow capital punishment.'56 Supreme Court precedent supports Justice
Scalia's approach.'57
The dissent advocated a broader scope of Trop v. Dulles15 8 analysis.159 Justice
Brennan ventured beyond the objective legislative and jury/prosecutor statistics
which have characterized Trop analysis. 6 0 Citing world statistics,' 6' the opinions of
special-interest groups,162 and age-based statutory classifications, 63 the dissent in-
sisted that evolving opinion militates against juvenile executions.'64
The dissent concluded that the juvenile death sentence is "excessive" punish-
ment.' 65 Because juveniles are impulsive, impressionable, vulnerable, and imma-
ture, Brennan insisted that juveniles lack the necessary culpability to be executed. 166
For the same reasons, the dissent refused to recognize any penological purpose in
juvenile executions. 67
"I Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 2986.
150 477 U.S. 399.
"' 356 U.S. 86.
152 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 2983.
154 Id.
Id. at 2976 n.3.
156 Id.
1 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). These Supreme Court eighth amendment death penalty cases have considered
the legislative statistics of only those thirty-seven states which allow capital punishment.
s Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86.
'19 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160 Id.
16 Id. at 2985. Justice Brennan claims that a majority of the 65 nations that retain capital punishment prohibit
juvenile executions. He also asserts that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Barbados, and the United States are
the only nations that have executed juveniles since 1979.
162 Id. Justice Brennan cites the American Bar Association, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws, and Amnesty International as groups which
oppose juvenile executions.
163 Id.
161 Id. at 2986.
165 Id. at 2994.
166 Id. at 2993.
167 Id.
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The dissent's suggested Trop v, Dulles168 analysis is too broad. Countless Su-
preme Court decisions have limited Trop analysis to objective evidence of society's
evolving standards of decency.169 In 1987, Justice Lewis F. Powell noted that most
of the Court's death penalty decisions have rested upon an examination of state leg-
islative and sentencing jury decisions.170 Justice Powell described these factors as
"a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values.""'' The
dissent's subjective opinion polls, age-based statutory classifications, and the
opinions of professional and special-interest groups are an uncertain foundation for
constitutional law. 172 Therefore, the dissent's reliance upon them is misplaced.
Equally debatable is the dissent's claim that juvenile executions are "exces-
sive." At the time of their crimes, Kevin Stanford and Heath Wilkins were only
months away from the age of majority. 173 Both of them had previous encounters with
the law. 174 To believe that neither of them appreciated the wrongfulness of their acts
is fantasy.
C. Stanford v. Kentucky: Implications of the Decision
The Court's decision sends three strong messages. First, the decision is fragile
and easily subject to change. Because both the plurality and the concurrence rely
heavily upon state legislative statistics, any change in these normative statistics will
change the Court's decision. Eighteen of the thirty-seven death penalty states have
not established a minimum age at which a capital offender may be death-eligible. 171
If these states "break their silence," the Court's view of the evolving standards of
decency are likely to change.
Second, the decision highlights the Court's disagreement over the proper
scope of Eighth Amendment analysis. Following precedent, the plurality's Trop v.
Dulles176 analysis is narrowly confined to objective legislative and jury statistics.
Both the concurrence and the dissent favor a broader Trop v. Dulles177 analysis. The
Court also disagreed about the importance of proportionality analysis. 178 These dis-
agreements will affect every eighth amendment case which the Court may hear.
'6 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86.
169 See supra note 86.
170 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
"'t Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976),
172 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
M3 Id. at 2972-73.
171 Id. at 2974. For example, Heath Wilkins was previously punished for burglary, theft, arson, and attempted
murder. Wilkins attempted to murder his mother by putting insecticide into her Tylenol capsules.
'71 Id. at 2976 n.3.
176 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86.
-7' Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2981-82. Justice O'Connor believes that age-based statutory classifications may
be relevant. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens insist that objective Trop v. Dulles factors
(e.g., legislative and jury statistics) are only the starting point for analysis.
7I Id. at 2980. The plurality asserts that proportionality analysis is marginally important. The concurrence
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Finally, the constitutionality of a fifteen year-old capital offender's death sen-
tence is still an open question. Justice O'Connor's Thompson v. Oklahoma 17 9
analysis is still operative. 80 Under the current Court, a fifteen year-old offender
may, most likely, be executed if the statute under which he was sentenced established
a minimum age of death-eligibility. 8 A change in society's evolving standards of
decency, as reflected through legislative and jury statistics, might also warrant a
fifteen year-old offender's execution.
CONCLUSION
By upholding Kevin Stanford's and Heath Wilkins' death sentences, the Su-
preme Court broke its silence on the eighth amendment constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty; the Court "bit the constitutional bullet."
Although the plurality, concurrence, and dissent analyzed the issue under the
traditional three step approach,'82 the Justices disagreed over the proper scope of
eighth amendment analysis. This disagreement will affect all eighth amendment
cases which the Court may hear.
Because the Court's decision is based upon legislative statistics and because
eighteen of the thirty-seven capital punishment states have not established a
minimum age of death-eligibility, the Court's decision is very fragile. If these
"silent states" express themselves, the court may find that society's evolving
standards of decency no longer warrant juvenile executions.
Finally, the constitutionality of a fifteen year-old offender's death sentence
remains an open question.
The Court's task in Stanford and Wilkins was not easy. However, through
considered judgment and deliberation, the Court formulated an appropriate response
to Kevin Stanford's and Heath Wilkins' brutality.
JOHN R. FRANK
"9 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1o Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'S' Because Justice Anthony Kennedy did not participate in the Thompson decision, his position on the
execution of fifteen year old capital offenders in unknown. However, by joining Justice Scalia's Stanford
opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested that he would uphold the constitutionality of a fifteen year old offender's
death sentence.
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